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KNEELING TO THE SEC RULES: THE VIRGINIA
TAKEOVER ACT AND SEC TENDER OFFER RULE 14d-2(b)
In December of 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) announced the adoption of rules,1 effective January 7, 1980,
as an administrative gloss on the Williams Act,2 the statute gov-
erning tender offers.3 When Congress passed the Williams Act in
1968 only one State, Virginia,4 had a statutory system that specifi-
cally regulated tender offers. Since 1968 thirty-six states also have
enacted laws regulating tender offers to fill the gaps left by the
federal legislation. 5 The state "takeover" statutes vary considera-
1. Tender Offers, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240 (1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
ch. 404, §§ 13-14, 48 Stat. 894-95 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1976))).
3. The Senate report on the Williams Act contains the following definition of a tender
offer:
This offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or a group to buy shares
of a company-usually at a price above the market price. Those accepting the
offer are said to tender their stock for purchase. The person making the offer
obligates himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered shares if
certain specified conditions are met.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1968), reprinted in [1968] ,LS. CODE CONG. &.AD. -NEws 2811. See also Feller, Tender
Offers: Judicial Definitions, SEcoND ANN. SEC. UPDATE 375 (1980).
4. Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act, VA. Cons ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -540 (1978 & Cure. Supp.
1980).
5. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Cum. Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-
456 to -468m (Cum. Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (CuM. Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 517.35-.363 (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAWAI
REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980 & Supp. 1980);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2 §§ 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-
3.1-1 to -11 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1980); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 502.102., .211-.215 (West Supp.
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1284 (1974); Ky. Rsv. STAT. §§ 292.560-.991 (Cum.
Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REy. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908
(Cum. Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (West Cum. Supp. 1980);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13
(West Cum. Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Cum. Supp. 1980); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. RED. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A-1 to :15 (1979 Supp.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1614
(McKinney Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp. 1979); OHIO REv.
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bly, but most require advance notice of tender offers.6 The advance
notice typically consists of a public filing of the material terms of
the offer twenty-one days before the offer may commence.
One of the rules adopted by the SEC in 1979, 14d-2,8 requires
that an offeror make a tender offer within five business days of an
announcement specifying the amount and price of the securities
sought. The SEC regards the filing of advance notice required by
state takeover statutes as an announcement within five days of
which an offer must commence.9 Consequently, by complying with
the SEC requirement that an offer commence within five days of
the state takeover statute filings, an offeror must violate the state
statutory command that an offer not commence until twenty-one
days after the announcement. If the offeror complies with the state
statute by waiting twenty-one days after the filing to make an of-
fer, the SEC regards the delay as an SEC filing and disclosure
violation.
Commenting on the conflict between the SEC rules and state
takeover statutes, SEC Commissioner Pollack has stated, "To the
extent that our rules are inconsistent with provisions in some state
laws, the provisions of our rule would, of course, be applicable
rather than the state provisions . . . .To put it another way, the
state provision will have to kneel to the rule that we ultimately
adopt." Notwithstanding the Commissioner's position, several
states have refused to "kneel to the [SEC] rule[s]."'10 Although the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held indirectly that the Williams Act preempted the Virginia
Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act,"' the United States Court of Ap-
CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp.
1980); S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1980); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to
-47 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (1979 & 1980 Cum. Supp.); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1978 & Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West 1980);
Tex. Administrative Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Tender Offers § 065.15.00.100,
reprinted in 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 55,671-55,682 (1979).
6. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-530(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1980).
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,325, 70,329 (1979); see 45 Fed. Reg. 15,521, 15,522 (1980).
10. New Rules Will Further SEC Goals, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 35, col. 3.
11. Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
97,154 (E.D. Va. 1979), vacated, 618 F.2d 1029 (1980). The district court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Virginia Takeover Act until the decision
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peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the holding.12 Similarly, a
Kentucky court recently held that the Kentucky takeover statute
withstands constitutional attack."3 In addition, the Commissioner
of Securities for Ohio filed suit against the SEC seeking a judg-
ment declaring the Ohio Tender Offer Act constitutional and SEC
rule 14d-2 invalid.14
This Note will discuss the Williams Act, the Virginia Take-Over-
Bid Disclosure Act (Virginia Takeover Act), the new SEC rules
regulating tender offers, and the possible preemption of the Vir-
ginia Takeover Act by the SEC rules.15
on the merits of a declaratory judgment action brought to declare the Virginia act pre-
empted by the Williams Act. Noting probable success on the merits, and stating that the
Virginia Act conflicted impermissibly with federal law, the district court granted the injunc-
tion. Id.
12. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980). The Fourth Circuit vacated
the order of the district court granting the injunction after discussing the preemption issue
and disagreeing with the district court on the probable success of the declaratory judgment
action. Id.
13. Strode v. Esmark, Inc., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,538 (Ky. Cir. Ct. May 13,
1980). See also AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio take-
over law held not preempted by Williams Act); Sun Life Group, Inc. v. Standard Life Ins.,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,314 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 1980)
(Indiana takeover act held not preempted by the Williams Act); Wilain, Inc. v. TRE Corp.,
412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980) (Delaware takeover statute held not preempted by the Wil-
liams Act). But see Eure v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,383 (N.C. Super. Ct. April 18, 1980). A federal district court recently
held that the Williams Act preempted most of the New Jersey Takeover Bid Disclosure Law
in a suit involving Kennecott Corporation as plaintiff against the Curtiss-Wright Corpora-
tion and the head of New Jersey's bureau of securities as defendants. Only the anti-fraud
provision of the New Jersey law survived. The court cited two objections to the New Jersey
statute: (1) the state law "'creates delay and uncertainty not contemplated by Congress' in
passing the Williams Act"; (2) the state law vests the power to decide upon the acceptability
of an offer in a state official rather than the investor. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1981, at 25, col. 3.
14. Ohio v. SEC, [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,688 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 1980). The
court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. Ohio asserted a parens patriae interest in the
case, but the court said no important state interest was threatened because the state was
free to implement its act until a plaintiff challenged the; act legally. Id. at 98,617.
15. This Note focuses exclusively on the question of preemption. State takeover statutes
also have been attacked as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. For a discus-
sion of the commerce clause issue, see Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A
Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
733, 752-53 (1979); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and
Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. Rav. 213, 242-46 (1977); Note, Commerce Clause Lim-
itations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:487
THE WILLIAMS ACT
Prior to the passage of the Williams Act, regulation of the two
major mechanisms for attaining control of a corporation, the proxy
contest and the tender offer,16 sharply contrasted. The proxy con-
test was the subject of comprehensive federal regulation1  whereas
few meaningful controls attached to the tender offer process." The
absence of tender offer regulation, and other factors,19 resulted in a
burgeoning of tender offers lodged for corporate control in the
early 1960's.20 The rapid increase in tender offers brought to light
and magnified abuses latent in the unregulated process. The
abuses resulted from acts both by the offerors or "raiders" and by
the management of the subject company or "target." Raiders could
capture control of the target in a matter of days, catching share-
holders and management uninformed and under pressure to act
without the opportunity to argue in opposition or to entertain
competing offers. Management or others who opposed a tender of-
fer exerted pressure on shareholders of the target corporation to
refuse offers on the basis of unsubstantiated arguments. Share-
holders bore the brunt of these abuses: if they succumbed to the
first raider's offer they missed the opportunity to enjoy greater
profit by selling to a competing raider or "white knight"; if they
bowed to pressure from management and refused to sell they re-
ceived no profit at all.21
16. Close regulation also attends the public exchange offer, an additional method of
obtaining control of a corporation. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1976).
17. See id. § 78n.
18. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REv. 136, 137
(1967) (federal regulation inapplicable to tender offer for cash).
19. See E. ARAow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973). The
authors discuss eight factors contributing to the increase in tender offers in addition to the
lack of federal or state regulation. Included among the factors are: inexpensiveness of the
tender offer process as compared with the proxy contest; increased corporate liquidity and
availability of credit; undervaluation of stocks; and increased respectability of the tender
offer method of achieving control of a corporation. Id. at 65-66. See also Boehm, supra note
15, at 734-36.
20. See generally note 157 & accompanying text infra.
21. Senator Kuchel, co-sponsor of the Williams Act, assessed the plight of management
and shareholder as follows: "[tihe corporation can be financially raped without management
or shareholders having any knowledge of the acquisitions .... The corporate raider may
thus act under the cloak of secrecy while obtaining the -shares needed to put him on the
road to a successful capture of the corporation." Proposed Amendments to the Securities
490
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Because of the exploitation of investors by target management
and raiders, Congress passed the Williams Act to protect "the
shareholders of the target corporation."22 The congressional atti-
tude toward the target management and the raiders is less clear.
When Senator Williams first introduced tender offer legislation in
1965, one of the objectives was protection of target management
against "industrial sabotage" from "reckless corporate raids."2 s By
1967, however, the presumption against tender offers had eroded
because of growing awareness that in some instances tender offers
promoted "the best interests of society by providing an effective
method of removing entrenched but inefficient management."24 In
adopting the Williams Act, therefore, Congress opted for regula-
tory neutrality,2 5 favoring neither tender offerors nor target man-
agement. The Senate Report of the Williams Act stated:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the bal-
ance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bid. The Bill is designed to re-
quire full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at
the same time providing the offeror and management equal op-
portunity to fairly present their case.26
That Congress avoided "tipping the balance" in favor of manage-
ment or raiders does not mean that Congress intended to preclude
state regulation that altered a business climate in which corpora-
tions lacked defense to takeovers. Although some courts and com-
mentators disagree with the proposition, 2  one view is that, by not
Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. of Banking and Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Kuchel).
22. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39 (1977).
23. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 19, at 64.
24. Id. at 66.
25. See Boehm, supra note 15, at 750-51; Pitt, Standing To Sue Under the Williams Act
After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117, 127-29 (1978-79);
Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53
N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 912-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as A Response to Great Western]; Note,
Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE
L.J. 510, 521-25 (1979).
26. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Seass. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 2811.
27. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1274-80 (5th Cir. 1978)
(fiduciary approach of Idaho statute conflicts with neutral, market approach of the Williams
1981]
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tipping the balance, Congress demurred from enacting a federal
scheme that favored either raiders or target management, concen-
trating instead on protection of the target corporation
shareholder.28
Congress effected its intent to protect investors by requiring dis-
closure of material information by tender offerors to target corpo-
ration shareholders. The Williams Act added section 13(d) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.29 Section 13(d) requires a person
or corporation that acquires five percent or more of any class of
equity securities of a registered corporation 0 to file a schedule 13D
with the SEC within ten days of the acquisition. 1 Through sched-
ule 13D the offeror discloses the amount and source of the funds
used for the purchase, the offeror's background and identity, the
extent of the offeror's holdings in the target corporation, and the
offeror's purpose in making the purchases.3 2 If the offeror's pur-
pose is to acquire control of the target corporation, the offeror
must disclose whether it plans to liquidate the corporation, sell the
corporation's assets, merge the corporation with another company,
or effect any major change in the target corporation's business. 3
The offeror also must provide the same information to the target
Act), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979);
Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Secur-
ities Committee, American Bar Association, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act,
32 Bus. LAW. 187, 193 (1976) [hereinafter cited as State Takeover Statutues and the Wil-
Uams Act] (Williams Act designed to create a balanced scheme). Though the ABA report
suggests that the Williams Act preempts state statutes in large part, the report states that
the opinion is "a value judgment and not a strict legal matter so that others considering the
matter might well favor a different resolution of what is essentially a political question." Id.
at 193 n.8. For further discussion of the balance between offeror and target, see Moylan,
State Regulation and Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687, 700 (1975); Note, The Effect of
the New SEC Rules on the Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 913, 924 (1980).
28. The better view is the latter. In rejecting the argument that the Williams Act implied
a private cause of action for tender offerors, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument
that neutrality was a purpose of the legislation. See note 122 & accompanying text infra.
29. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454-55 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1976)).
30. For the registration requirements, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781 (1976).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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corporation. The SEC must receive a schedule 13D filing regardless
of how a person acquires five percent of the target's stock; conse-
quently, purchasers of five percent of a corporation's stock on the
open market must file the schedule 13D."
If a tender offer is the means of stock acquisition, the offeror
must file a schedule 14D-1 with the SEC in addition to the sched-
ule 13D.35 Schedule 14D-13 6 must disclose, in addition to the same
information as schedule 13D, the offeror's past transactions with
the target corporation; 7 the applicability of anti-trust laws;38 mar-
gin requirements of section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934"9 and approvals or regulatory requirements with which the of-
feror must comply in connection with the tender offer;' 0 any mate-
rial legal proceedings relating to the tender offer;41 and any materi-
al financial information about the fferor.' 2 The offeror must
publish or send schedule 14D-1 information to the shareholders of
the target corporation. 3
The Williams Act also provides protection of the target corpora-
tion's shareholders by dictating certain procedures that tender of-
ferors must follow. A tendering shareholder may withdraw his
shares within fifteen days after receiving the offer or sixty days
after the commencement of the offer if the offeror has not pur-
chased the tendered shares." If the offeror has offered to purchase
less than all of the outstanding shares and the shareholders tender
more shares than the offeror has offered to purchase within ten
days after the offer has commenced, the offeror must purchase the
34. Id. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
35. Id. § 78n(d) (1976).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1980).
37. Id. § 240.14d-100(7) (1980).
38. Id. § 240.14d-100(10)(c) (1980).
39. Id. § 240.14d-100(10)(d) (1980).
40. Id. § 240.14d-100(10)(b) (1980). Presumably, the approvals and regulatory require-
ments referred to in this section include state requirements.
41. Id. § 240.14d-100(10) (1980).
.42. Id. § 240.14d-100(10)(e) (1980).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100(10)(f) (1980).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1980). But see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976) (providing for
seven day withdrawal rights). See also Boehm, supra note 15, at 751-52 (questioning consti-
tutionaliity of fifteen day withdrawal period in SEC rules because the Williams Act provides
for only a seven day period).
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shares pro rata.'5 If the offeror raises the premium over market
price, and if he will pay for the shares before expiration of the of-
fer, the offeror must pay the higher price to all tendering share-
holders.48 The offer must stay open for at least twenty days.47 Sec-
tion 14e of the Williams Act also prohibits the use of any false or
misleading statements during the tender offer period.48
Section 14d of the Williams Act applies only to tender offerors
who seek to acquire five percent or more of the beneficial owner-
ship of the target company.49 In addition, tender offerors are ex-
empt from the requirements of section 14d if: the acquisition of
the target corporation's shares together with all other acquisitions
by the same person of the same class of securities during the pre-
ceding twelve months would not exceed two percent of that class; 50
the SEC by regulation determines that the tender offeror did not
have the intent to change the control of the issuer, and the tender
offer did not actually change the control;"1 or the tender offeror is
the issuer of the shares.2 In the last instance, however, the issuer
is subject to the prohibition in section 14e against misleading and
false statements.53
THE VIRGINIA TAKEOVER ACT
When Congress enacted the Williams Act, only one state, Vir-
ginia, had legislation regulating tender offers.5 The Virginia Take-
over Act largely parallels the disclosure and procedural require-
ments of the Williams Act. 5 The operation of the Virginia statute
commences at the time of a takeover bid. The statute defines a bid
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976). The percentage of each shareholder's shares tendered
that is taken up by the offeror pro rata is the total number of shares purchased divided by
the total number of shares tendered.
46. Id. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (1980).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
49. Id. § 78m(d) (1976).
50. Id. § 78m(d)(6)(B) (1976).
51. Id. § 78m(d)(6)(D) (1976).
52. Id. § 78m(d)(6)(C) (1976).
53. Id. § 78n(e) (1976).
54. See Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act, VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -540 (1978 & Cum.
Supp. 1980).
55. See generally 12 U. RICH. L. Rav. 749 (1978) (comparing the two statutes).
[Vol. 22:487494
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as any offer, not otherwise exempt, for ten percent or more of any
class of equity securities of an issuer.8 6 Exemptions obtain for iso-
lated offers to individual investors, an offer by an issuer to
purchase its own shares, offers to purchase shares not registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, bro-
kers' transactions in the ordinary course of business, and offers ap-
proved by the directors of the target corporation and accepted by
two-thirds of the stockholders of the target after solicitation of
proxies." An offeror may not make a tender offer until he has filed
a disclosure statement with the State Corporation Commission.58
The statement must contain: the name, address, and business ex-
perience of the offeror; the terms of the tender offer, including the
procedural obligations of the offeror;59 the source and amount of
funds used in making the takeover bid; any plans the offeror may
have to liquidate the target corporation, sell its assets, merge it
with another corporation, or change its business; the number of
shares the offeror already owns; and any past transactions between
the offeror and the target company.60 The disclosure statement so
parallels the disclosure required by the Williams Act that a federal
schedule 14D-1 suffices as a Virginia disclosure statement."
Like the Williams Act, the Virginia Takeover Act contains pro-
cedures permitting the security holder to withdraw his securities
after the commencement of the tender offer, 2 requiring the tender
offeror to purchase securities of security holders pro rata if more
are tendered than he offered to purchase, 3 and requiring the of-
feror to pay all tendering security holders during the offer period
the higher premium if the offeror raises the premium during the
offer period." The Virginia statute also prohibits the use of any
false or misleading statements during the tender offer period. 5
The Virginia Takeover Act and the Williams Act diverge in two
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(i) (1978).
57. Id. § 13.1-529(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
58. Id. § 13.1-531(a).
59. See notes 62-65 & accompanying text infra.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
61. Id. § 13.1-531(bl).
62. Id. § 13.1-530(b).
63. Id. § 13.1-530(c).
64. Id. § 13.1-530(d).
65. Id. § 13.1-533 (1978).
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ways. Unlike the Williams Act, which requires no notification of
the tender offer prior to its commencement, the Virginia Takeover
Act prohibits making the takeover bid until twenty days after the
offeror has filed the disclosure statement with the State Corpora-
tion Commission and sent the information required in the disclo-
sure statement to the offerees. 6 Additionally, the Virginia statute
provides for a hearing before the State Corporation Commission
where good cause exists, 7 ordered either sua sponte by the Com-
mission or at the request of the target company.6 8 The Commission
determines whether the offeror "propose[s] to make fair, full and
effective disclosure to offerees of all information material to a deci-
sion to accept or reject the offer."69 The hearing must begin within
forty days of the filing, and the Commission must decide within
twenty-five days of the conclusion of the hearing and filing of the
post-hearing briefs.70
The second point of divergence between the Virginia statute and
the Williams Act, regulation of certain open market purchases, re-
sulted from a 1979 amendment to the Virginia statute, although
the General Assembly modified the amendment in 1980.2 The
1979 amendment qualified the exemption from the Virginia Take-
over Act for offers effected through a broker-dealer on a stock ex-
change or in the over-the-counter market. The exemption only ob-
tained if the purchaser showed the State Corporation Commission
that he did not intend by his purchase to gain control of the issuer;
if the purchaser failed to meet the burden, he could not purchase
more than one percent of each of the issuer's offered classes of se-
curities each six months.7 3 By contrast, the Williams Act regulates
66. Id. § 13.1-531(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
67. Id. § 13.1-531(b)(ii).
68. Id. § 13.1-531(b)(i).
69. Id. § 13.1-531(b)(iii).
70. Id. § 13.1-534(b). Prior to amendment in 1978, the period within which the Commis-
sion had to hold a hearing was sixty days; additionally, the statute specified no time limit
within which the Commission had to decide. Act of March 23, 1977, ch. 356, 1977 Va. Acts
503 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-534(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
71. Act of Mar. 9, 1979, ch. 200, 1979 Va. Acts 258 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-529(b)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
72. Act of Mar. 9, 1980, ch. 216, 1980 Va. Acts 228 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
529(b)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
73. The 1979 amendment is italicized below:
An offer to purchase shares to be effected by a registered broker-dealer on a
496 [Vol. 22:487
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open market purchases only to the extent that a purchaser must
file a schedule 13D if the purchaser acquires five percent of an is-
suer's stock, regardless of the manner of acquisition.7 4 The argua-
ble conflict between the relatively regulation-free approach to open
market purchases in the Williams Act and the 1979 amendment's
application of the Virginia statute to such purchases gave occasion
for judicial assessment of the constitutionality of the Virginia stat-
ute in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,7 15 discussed later in this Note in
the section on preemption. 8
The 1980 session of the Virginia General Assembly largely re-
stored the exemption for open market purchases. The Virginia
Takeover Act now applies only to open market purchasers who of-
fer to purchase with the intent of changing the control of the is-
suer. Open market purchasers are exempt from the statute if: 1)
the State Corporation Commission determines that the purchaser
does not have the intent to change control; or 2) notwithstanding
the intent to change control, the purchaser files with the Commis-
sion and the issuer a statement disclosing the purpose of the
change of control and the method of carrying out the change of
control. As a consequence, the 1980 revision operates to exempt
stock exchange or in the over-the-counter market if the broker performs only
the customary broker's function, and receives no more than the customary bro-
ker's commissions, and neither the principal nor the broker solicits or arranges
for the solicitation of orders to sell shares of the offeree company, provided,
however, that no more than one percentum of the outstanding shares of such
class have been acquired by the offeror pursuant to this clause during the
preceding six months.
Act of Mar. 9, 1979, ch. 200, 1979 Va. Acts 258.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
75. 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980).
76. See text accompanying notes 134-141 infra.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1980). The 1980 amendment replaced
the 1979 amendment with the following language:
provided, however, that this exemption shall not apply to any such offer made
by a person who intends to change the control of the offeree company unless
such person shall have filed with the Commission and with the registered agent
of the offeree company a statement setting forth the purpose of such change,
the method of carrying out such intention and such other information as the
Commission may require as necessary in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors; and any person who, at the time he makes such offer, owns in
excess of ten percentum of any class of the equity securities of the offeree com-
pany and has purchased more than one percentum of such class during the
twelve month period preceding such offer shall be presumed to have such in-
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open market purchases from the Virginia statute unless the State
Corporation Commission determines that the intent of the pur-
chaser is to change control of the issuer and the purchaser refuses
to make the limited disclosure of purpose and method of change of
control.78
The Virginia statutory system regulating takeover bids is dis-
tinctive in two respects. The Virginia Takeover Act applies only to
Virginia corporations doing business in the state.79 The protections
of the statute do not attach to target companies that merely incor-
porate in Virginia without having substantial assets or activities in
the state.80 Another unusual feature of the Virginia statute is that
the State Corporation Commission, as part of its mandate to en-
force the Virginia Takeover Act, has judicial as well as administra-
tive powers." Thus, the Commission has authority to issue injunc-
tions and orders, punish 2 violations of its orders and injunctions
with contempt proceedings, and punish all violations of the Act by
fines of up to $50008S or prison terms of up to one year.84
THE SEC RULEs
The new SEC rules85 state that an offeror commences a tender
offer by a public announcement, through a press release, newspa-
tention unless the Commission determines otherwise ....
Act of Mar. 9, 1980, ch. 216, 1980 Va. Acts (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(iii)
(Cum. Supp. 1980)).
The Virginia General Assembly approved the 1980 amendment on March 19, 1980, more
than two months after the new SEC rules took effect. The legislature presumably responded
to the preeminence of the policy of the Williams Act regarding open market purchases by
revamping legislation passed only a year earlier. That the Assembly did not respond simi-
larly to the five day time limit of the new SEC rules-instead choosing to retain the twenty
day prenotification period-allows an inference that the legislators considered the prenotifi-
cation provision of the Virginia Takeover Act constitutionally sound.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
79. Id. § 13.1-529(e). Some states, Delaware for example, apply their takeover statutes to
corporations organized in the state regardless of the location of the principal place of busi-
ness of the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
80. See Buford, The Virginia Takeover Statute, State Takeover Statutes and New
Takeover Strategies-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1469 (1977).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-535 (1978).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 13.1-536.
84. Id.
85. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d (1980).
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per advertisement, or public statement, that identifies the offeror,
the target company, the offering price, and the number of shares
sought."' The date that the tender offer commences is significant
because the commencement date triggers operation of the SEC
rules.8 7 Obligations imposed by the rules on the tender offeror or
"bidder" comprise four categories. The first group of obligations is
the filing requirements. The bidder must file a schedule 14D-1
with the SEC and hand deliver the initial filing and any amend-
ments to the target company or "subject company" as soon as
practical after the commencement date.8 Second come the dissem-
ination provisions. The three alternative methods of disseminating
a cash offer to security holders are long-form publication, summary
publication, and the use of shareholder lists by either the bidder or
the subject company, at the latter's election.8 9
The third category of obligations imposed by the SEC rules is
the disclosure requirements. Although the disclosure requirements
vary depending upon the dissemination method selected, generally
the offeror must disclose: the identity of the bidder and subject
company; the amount and class of securities sought and the
amount and type of consideration given for the securities; the
scheduled expiration date of the tender offer; whether the offeror
may extend that date and, if so, the procedures for extension; the
dates when security holders who deposited securities can withdraw
them; the period within which the offeror will take up pro rata se-
curities deposited; if dissemination is by summary publication,
whether the purpose of the tender offer is to acquire or change the
business of the subject company; and, summary financial informa-
tion about the bidder.90
The last category of obligations imposed on the tender offeror is
substantive. A tender offer must remain open for at least twenty
business days from the date of its commencement and for ten busi-
ness days from the date of any increase in the consideration of-
fered. 91 If the offeror has not purchased the shares, a tendering
86. Id. § 240.14d-2(b) to (c).
87. Id. § 240.14d-2(a).
88. Id. § 240.14d-3.
89. Id. § 240.14d-4 to -5.
90. Id. § 240.1-4d-6.
91. Id. § 240.14e-l(a).
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shareholder may withdraw his shares within the first fifteen busi-
ness days of the offer period or after sixty calendar days from com-
mencement.92 The withdrawal period extends ten days after the
commencement of any competing offer. 93 The bidder must pay for,
or return, the deposited securities promptly after the termination
or withdrawal of the tender offer.94
The subject company becomes subject to three rules. First, if the
bidder chooses dissemination by shareholder list, the subject com-
pany must either give the list to the bidder or use the list to dis-
tribute the bidder's offering material at the subject company's
election.9" Second, the subject company must disclose its position
regarding the tender offer, with the reasons for its position, within
ten business days of the date of first publication of the offer or its
transmittal to the security holders. The statement by the subject
company must either recommend acceptance or rejection of the of-
fer, express no opinion and remain neutral, or state that the sub-
ject company cannot take a position regarding the tender offer.98
Third, the subject company must file a schedule 14D-9"7 disclosing:
any material contract or understanding and any conflict of interest
between the bidder and the subject company or their respective
officers, directors, or affiliates; whether any of the subject com-
pany's officers, directors, or affiliates intend to sell or tender their
shares in the subject company; and whether negotiations have oc-
curred in response to the tender offer dealing with mergers or reor-
ganizations, the sale or transfer of a substantial amount of the sub-
ject company's assets, any material change in the subject
company's capitalization or dividend policy, or a tender offer or
other acquisition of the subject company's securities. 8 Commence-
ment of the tender offer, the date of the public announcement,
triggers operation of the rules.99 The date of the public announce-
92. Id. § 240.14d-7(a)(1). Cf. text accompanying note 44 supra (same 15 day withdrawal
period under the Williams Act).
93. Id. § 240.14d-7(a)(2).
94. Id. § 240.14e-1(c).
95. Id. § 240.14d-5.
96. Id. § 240.14d-9.
97. Id. § 240.14d-101.
98. Id.
99. See note 86 & accompanying text supra.
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ment will not remain the date of commencement of the tender of-
fer, however, if within five business days of the public announce-
ment the offeror either withdraws its offer or files a schedule 14D-1
with the SEC and complies with the other dissemination, disclo-
sure, and substantive provisions contained in the aforementioned
rules. 100 The SEC, effectively, requires that the offeror elect either
the withdrawal or compliance "option," because "[i]f the bidder
exercises neither option, the tender offer commences on the date of
the initial announcement, resulting, however, in filing and disclo-
sure violations. As a result, it is not anticipated that a bidder mak-
ing such a public announcement will select the 'do nothing'
alternative. '"101
The consequence of the SEC rules is the creation of a five day
time limit after a public announcement within which a tender of-
feror must either withdraw its offer or comply with the SEC rules.
By incorporating the five day time limit in the regulatory regime,
the SEC imposes on tender offerors a mechanism by which compli-
ance with both the SEC rules and the state takeover statute provi-
sions for pre-offer notice and hearings is impossible. To ensure the
point is lost on no one, the SEC says as much in its report on the
tender offer rules:
These requirements of the state statutes will trigger the com-
mencement of the tender offer under Rule 14d-2(b) despite the
fact that the state statutes do not permit the offer to commence
until the conclusion of any applicable waiting period and hear-
ing process. Moreover, by deeming commencement to occur on
the date of the publication or filing required by these statutes,
the minimum periods, best price, and withdrawal and pro rata
rights provided under these statutes could not function since
they are usually predicated on the effective date of the tender
offer which cannot occur until after the conclusion of the waiting
period and hearing process.
Thus, the conflict between Rule 14d-2(b) and such state stat-
utes is so direct and substantial as to make it impossible to com-
ply with both sets of requirements as they presently exist. While
recognizing its long and beneficial partnership with the states in
the regulation of securities transactions, the Commission never-
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1980).
101. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,325, 70,329 (1979).
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theless believes that the state takeover statutes presently in ef-
fect frustrate the operation and purpose of the Williams Act and
that, based upon the abuses in current tender offer practice dis-
cussed above, Rule 14d-2(b) is necessary for the protection of
investors and to achieve the purposes of the Williams Act.'02
Although the SEC does not assert directly that its rules have pre-
empted the state takeover statutes, SEC commentary on the rules
and SEC arguments before the Supreme Court manifest a disposi-
tion that the rules preempt state takeover statutes.1 0 3 The phrase
"abuses in current tender offer practice," cited by the SEC, refers
to "pre-commencement public announcements [that] cause secur-
ity holders to make investment decisions with respect to a tender
offer on the basis of incomplete information and trigger market ac-
tivity normally attendant to a tender offer, such as arbitrageur ac-
tivity.'10 4 The SEC posited two rationales to support the five day
time limit: (1) the limit curtails precommencement announcements
that lead security holders to make investment decisions on the ba-
sis of inadequate information; (2) the limit restricts activity in ad-
vance of the actual offer that disadvantages the target shareholder.
This Note will analyze these rationales in its discussion of
policy.10 5
PREEMPTION
The "Force and Effect of Law" Doctrine
The SEC adopted Rule 14d-2(b), which establishes the five day
period following a public announcement within which tender offers
must commence, pursuant to a broad grant of authority by Con-
gress to the SEC "to make such rules and regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate"106 to implement the provisions of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934. Courts have interpreted this grant
as a delegation to the SEC of the "primary responsibility for pro-
102. Id. at 70,329-30 (footnotes omitted).
103. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979).
104. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326, 70,329 (1979) (footnote omitted).
105. See text accompanying notes 142-153 infra.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1976).
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tection of investors in securities. ' 10 7 Properly promulgated,108 sub-
stantive 09 SEC rules have the "force and effect of law" and, conse-
quently, are binding on courts 10 if the congressional "grant of
authority contemplates the regulations issued.""1
If a reviewing court framed the issue of preemption of the Vir-
ginia Takeover Act by the SEC rules as whether Congress in its
grant of rulemaking authority to the SEC contemplated Rule 14d-
2(b), the five day time limit, the SEC rules would subordinate the
Virginia statute because, under the force and effect of law doctrine,
"agency regulations implementing federal statutes have been held
to pre-empt state law under the Supremacy Clause." 12 If, however,
a court frames the issue of SEC rule preemption of the Virginia
statute as whether the congressional grant of rulemaking authority
to the SEC contemplated preemption of state statutes, the legisla-
tive history of the Williams Act indicates that a conclusion of pre-
emption is less likely."3
107. Quinn and Co. v. SEC, 452 F.2d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 1971) (citing Stead v. SEC, 444
F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir. 1971)).
108. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974) (stating the Commission's duty to pro-
mulgate rules through proper procedures).
109. A substantive rule or "legislative type" rule is one "affecting individual rights and
obligations." Id. at 232. "Legislative, or substantive, regulations are 'issued by an agency
pursuant to statutory authority and ... implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy
rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission .... Such rules have the force and
effect of law."' Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERALS'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3
(1947)). A substantive rule or regulation differs from interpretive rules, which are "issued by
an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 30 n.3
(1947)). See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960). See generally 1 K. DAvIs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958 & Supps. 1970, 1976).
110. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979).
111. Id. at" 308.
112. Id. at 295-96 (Army procurement regulations have the force and effect of law) (citing
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963)); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (Treasury
regulations creating right of survivorship in U.S. savings bonds registered in co-ownership
form have force and effect of law); Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534
(1958) (Army, Navy, and Air Force regulations under statutes providing for comprehensive
policy governing procurement have force and effect of law). See also Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (regulation by Secretary of Agriculture permitting variation be-
tween actual quantity and stated quantity on package has force and effect of law).
113. See note 115 & accompanying text infra.
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Congressional Intent to Preempt
Preemption of a state statute will occur if Congress expressly de-
clares an intent to vitiate state regulation of a particular area 14 or
if a court can infer such intent.115 No explicit statement of intent
to preempt state regulation of tender offers appears in the Wil-
liams Act" 6 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which the Wil-
liams Act amended.117 The only statement governing the relation-
ship between federal and state regulation in the securities area
appears in section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securi-
ties commission (or any officer performing like functions) of any
state over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder." 8 The Supreme Court has stated that section 28 "was
plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state
authority.' ' 1 9
114. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218 (1947) (Federal Warehouse Act explicitly preempted concurrent state regulation).
115. A court will infer preemptive intent if federal regulation of an area is pervasive, see
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (pervasive federal reg-
ulation of aircraft noise preempts local noise controls), or if the federal interest in the area
is sufficiently dominant, see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). The dominant federal interest and pervasive federal regulation bases for preemption
in the securities area fade upon examination of the history of federal-state cooperation in
the securities field. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex.
1977) (coexistence of federal and state securities regulation since the beginning of federal
regulation in field is "an impassable barrier loom[ing] across this road to preemption"),
afl'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132 (1963) (minimum federal avocado standards may be supplemented by higher state
standards notwithstanding specific congressional rejection of the higher state standards).
See also A Response to Great Western, supra fiote 25, at 906-17.
116. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1035 (4th Cir. 1980); A Response to Great
Western, supra note 25, at 910.
117. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 & n.13 (1979) (indicating that
§ 28 was intended to leave as much flexibility with the states as was possible).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976).
119. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979) (section 28 not a basis for a
duty on states not to enforce state securities regulation; section 27 giving federal courts
jurisdiction of actions for violation of the Act not a basis for venue).
In the majority opinion, the Court in Leroy referred to a statement by Thomas Corcoran,
a principal draftsman of the Securities Exchange Act, in which Corcoran indicated that "the
purpose of § 28(a) was to leave the States with as much leeway to regulate securities trans-
504
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Neither does the legislative history of the Williams Act evidence
an intent to preempt state takeover statutes. The only tenable ar-
gument for inferring an intent to preempt from the legislative his-
tory of the Williams Act rests on the purported objective of Con-
gress to maintain neutrality between tender offeror and
management of the target company. According to this argument,
state statutes favor management, thus upsetting congressionally
mandated neutrality. In other words, Congress intended neutrality
between offeror and management, but state statutes favor manage-
ment; therefore, Congress intended state takeover acts to yield to
the Williams Act.120
The Supreme Court rejected the inference that Congress in-
tended raider-management neutrality in the Williams Act when
the Court addressed the issue of tender offerors' standing to sue in
actions as the Supremacy Clause would allow them in the absence of such a provision." Id.
at 182 n.13 (citing Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.), 56, and 97 (73d Cong.) Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6577 (1934) (statement of
Thomas Corcoran).
Justice White, dissenting, agreed with the Fifth Circuit which held that § 28 not only does
not protect state authority but imposes an affirmative duty on states not to legislate incon-
sistently with the Act. 443 U.S. at'191 & n.4 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1271 (5th Cir. 1978)). After disagreeing with the majority
on the issue of venue, Justice White concluded:
[T]he only question, then, is whether the Williams Act imposes on state offi-
cials, expressly or impliedly, the duty not to enact or enforce legislation incon-
sistent therewith. In -my view, the answer to this question must be in the af-
firmative. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that if state law
conflicts with federal law, federal law prevails. Given this command, the very
enactment and existence of the Williams Act pre-empts and invalidates all
conflicting state efforts to regulate cash tender offers.
Id. at 190 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Most commentators agree that Congress enacted § 28 in order to preserve state blue sky
laws that are based on the jurisdictional nexus of shareholder situs rather than to address
state takeover statutes. The section, however, supports the assertion of federal-state cooper-
ation in the context of tender offer regulation. See A Response to Great Western, supra
note 25, at 909-10 n.271.
120. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). The Fifth Circuit
stated that promanagement state statutes disrupt the "neutrality indispensable for the
proper operation of the federal market approach to tender offers legislation." Id. at 1279-80.
See also E. APNow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 234-76 (1973);
State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, supra note 27, at 188; Note, The Effect of
the New SEC Rules on the Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 913 (1980).
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Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.121 The SEC argued that the
Court should infer standing for tender offerors from the Williams
Act in furtherance of the congressional policy of neutrality. The
Supreme Court denied the inference that neutrality was a purpose
of the Williams Act, holding, "neutrality is, rather, but one charac-
teristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the pro-
tection of investors." '122 Because the Court views management-
raider neutrality as a byproduct, rather than a purpose, of the Wil-
liams Act, the argument that state takeover statutes favor manage-
ment by delaying takeover bids,123 even if true, is an insubstantial
basis for inferring congressional intent to preempt state takeover
statutes pursuant to a congressional policy of neutrality.124
Judicial Consideration of the Preemption Doctrine
The judiciary only reluctantly has found federal preemption of
state law based on mere inferences of congressional intent. The Su-
preme Court recently concluded that the Robinson-Patman Act 25
did not preempt a Maryland statute126 requiring that refiners give
gasoline allowances to all Maryland retailers. Although the federal
act did not address allowance allocation by refiners, this omission
failed to support an inference of preemption.1 27 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit refused to find that federal law preempted a stat-
ute 28  prohibiting automobile manufacturers from granting
franchises unless the manufacturer first notified all area dealers in
that line of automobile, even though Congress rejected incorpora-
tion of a similar proposal in the federal Dealer's Day in Court
Act.1 29
Preemption meets with even more disfavor in the area of securi-
ties regulation. The Supreme Court articulated this disfavor, say-
121. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
122. Id. at 29.
123. See generally note 155 & accompanying text infra.
124. See Boehm, supra note 15, at 746-52.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
126. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (Cum. Supp. 1978).
127. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-547(d) (1980).
129. American Motor Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219, 224 (4th
Cir. 1979).
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ing, "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are re-
luctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden."130 Equally compelling is the approach outlined by the
Court in areas of conflict between state law and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Despite an actual conflict between California
law and New York Stock Exchange rules promulgated pursuant to
the 1934 Act, the Court upheld the California statute.131 The Court
stated that the proper approach in preemption cases is "to recon-
cile 'the operation of [federal and state] statutory schemes with
one another rather than holding one completely ousted.' 132
One must conclude from the corpus of judicial and legislative
commentary on the relation between state takeover statutes and
the Williams Act that, in its grant of rulemaking authority to the
SEC, Congress did not contemplate, expressly or impliedly, pre-
emption of state regulation. The Fourth Circuit found support in
the congressional and judicial presumption against preemption of
state takeover statutes when it vacated a district court injunction
against enforcement of the Virginia Takeover Act.113
In Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,lu the district court granted an
injunction, stating that the 1979 amendment to the Virginia Take-
over Act 5 5 "conflicts with the structure and objectives of the Ex-
change Act and the Regulations and Rules promulgated thereun-
der. The Virginia Act is in conflict therewith-in any number of
ways . ... ,6 The district court hinted that "other infirmities" of
the Virginia Act rendered it unconstitutional. 31 The Fourth Cir-
130. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (emphasis added) (refusing to
set aside merger or otherwise provide federal remedy in addition to state remedy of judicial
appraisal in action by minority stockholders of subsidiary corporation against parent corpo-
ration). See also Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910
(1969).
131. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
132. Id. at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
133. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980).
134. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 97,154 (E.D. Va. 1979), va-
cated, 618 F.2d 1029 (1980).
135. See notes 73-76 & accompanying text supra.
136. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. at 96,370.
137. Id. at 96,371.
19811
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cuit, although addressing only the issue of whether the district
court ought to have granted the injunction, digressed on the ques-
tion of federal preemption of the Virginia Act. The court refused
to base preemption on the contention that the Virginia Takeover
Act favors the target's management, reasoning: "Doubtless, most of
the holders of [the target's] stock had invested in that company on
the faith of its then present management."1 8 Assuming that the
aim of the Virginia statute was to protect target management, the
court stated that the protection purpose "seems consistent with,
rather than antagonistic to, the purpose of the Williams Act."' 139
The court further stated that, although a possible conflict inhered
in the delay engendered by the opportunity for a hearing granted
by the Virginia Act,140 an opportunity not afforded by the Williams
Act, this potential conflict did not serve as an adequate basis for a
finding of preemption.' 4 '
138. 618 F.2d at 1034.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1035.
141. Id. (citing Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (indicating that the
states have not been precluded from legislating in the securities field)). Although the SEC
rules became effective more than two months prior to the decision, see 44 Fed. Reg. 70,325,
70,326 (1980), the Fourth Circuit refused to consider the effect of the new rules on the
validity of the Virginia Takeover Act because the court mistakenly assumed the rules were
not yet in effect. 618 F.2d at 1036 n.10. Significant, however, is the action by the Virginia
General Assembly to accommodate the new SEC rules by deleting the Virginia statute's
provisions for advance notice of an offer and a hearing. See note 73 supra.
Other states have taken steps to accommodate their takeover statutes to the time limit in
Rule 14d-2(b). Wisconsin has omitted from its takeover regulation the requirement of dis-
closure of price and class of securities sought. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West 1980).
Thus, the disclosure falls outside of the definition of a public announcement triggering the
commencement period and the SEC rules. Wisconsin also permits conditional takeover of-
fers, a device that allows commencement of offers without disclosure although the offer is
conditioned on state approval. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West 1980). The Indiana Se-
curities Division has vitiated the pre-offering period required under the Indiana statute if
the offer is subject to the Williams Act. Fogelson, Recent Developments in Defensive Strat-
egies and Tactics, SECOND ANN. SEC. UPDATE 405 (1980).
The Ohio Securities Commissioner, however, brought suit against the SEC seeking a de-
claratory judgment validating the Ohio takeover statute and invalidating the SEC rules.
Ohio v. SEC, [19801 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,688 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (indicating that
state should enforce statute until challenged). Courts in both Kentucky, Strode v. Esmark,
Inc., [1980] FaD. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 97,538 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1980), and Delaware, Wylain, Inc.
v. TRE Corp., No. 6039 (Del. Ch. Jan. 39, 1980), have upheld their state takeover statutes
despite rendition of decision after the SEC rules became effective. As with the Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, neither court directly considered the effect of the new SEC rules on the state
508
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In addition to the legislative history of the Williams Act and ju-
dicial assessment of the relation between federal and state
securites regulation, policy considerations support the Fourth Cir-
cuit's refusal to find that the Williams Act or the rules issued pur-
suant thereto by the SEC preempt the Virginia Takeover Act.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The SEC has advanced two arguments in support of the five day
time limit of Rule 14d-2(b): (1) the five day time limit curtails
precommencement announcements that "cause security holders to
make investment decisions with respect to a tender offer on the
basis of incomplete information"; 42 and (2) the time limit restricts
activity in advance of the actual offer that disadvantages the target
shareholder, specifically "arbitrageur activity. 1 43 Because the pro-
tections of the Williams Act do not become effective until the offer
commences, according to the SEC, investors lack protection during
the precommencement stage of the tender offer process. Precom-
mencement activity, therefore, should remain minimal, and Rule
14d-2(b) accomplishes this objective.144 An additional justification
for the time limit in the SEC rule, proffered by courts and com-
mentators, is that, by preempting state takeover statutes, the rule
vitiates the bias in favor of target management inherent in state
statutes. 45
Precommencement Shareholder Decisions Without Adequate
Information
The SEC contention that state takeover acts force precom-
mencement decisions by the target shareholder without adequate
information ignores the purpose and effect of state takeover legis-
lation. The purpose of the Virginia Takeover Act is to "protect the
interests of offerees, investors and the public by requiring that an
statutes.
142. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,325, 70,329 (1979).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Great W. United Corp. v. KidweU, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-79 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). See Note, The
Effect of the New SEC Rules on the Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORD-
HAM UiR. L.J. 913, 924 (1980).
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offeror make fair, full and effective disclosure to offerees of all in-
formation material to a decision to accept or reject a take-over
bid."'146 The requirement of a twenty day period after announce-
ment but before commencement of the tender offer provides this
protection. 14 7 During the precommencement period target share-
holders can determine, on the basis of required disclosures by the
offeror, whether: (1) to sell and hence realize an immediate profit;
(2) to wait for a competing bid hoping to realize a larger profit; (3)
not to sell in contemplation of the failure of the takeover bid, re-
flecting a confidence in present management and corporate philos-
ophy; or (4) not to sell in contemplation of a successful takeover
bid, reflecting satisfaction with the tender offeror's disclosed pur-
poses in pursuing the takeover bid. The Virginia Takeover Act also
provides for a hearing, if good cause exists, to ensure the accuracy
of the required disclosures. 48 The complex of factors considered
by target shareholders requires time and accurate, complete infor-
mation before shareholders can decide intelligently whether to
tender their shares. Contrary to the arguments of the SEC, the
Virginia Act provides both the necessary time, through its required
waiting period, and the essential information, through its
mandatory disclosure provision, which is buttressed by a possible
hearing to ensure accuracy and thoroughness of information.
Arbitrage Activity
The SEC contention that state takeover statutes allow the trig-
gering of arbitrage activity to the detriment of target shareholders
is flawed.'49 The detriment to target shareholders results from
arbitrageurs buying target stock on the open market at the market
price and then selling the stock to the tender offeror at the higher
tender offer price. Consequently, arbitrage activity reduces the
number of tendering shareholder shares accepted in prorated cash
offers.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-528(B) (1978).
147. Id. § 13.1-531(a).
148. Id.
149. Arbitrage is the purchase of shares in one market and sale in another market shortly
afterwards at a higher price. See Note, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage be Regulated?, 1978
DUKE L.J. 1000.
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The relation between state takeover acts and arbitrage activity,
however, avoids damage to tendering shareholders. The greatest
disincentive to arbitrage activity is state takeover legislation be-
cause the state statutes pose a threat to consummation of the
tender offer. The greater the risk that the takeover bid will fail, the
greater the risk that the arbitrageur cannot find a buyer offering a
higher price than the arbitrageur paid for the stock.150 State take-
over acts increase the risk of takeover failure, thus discouraging
arbitrage activity. 151 The argument that state tender offer legisla-
tion encourages arbitrage activity ignores the realities of arbi-
trageur decisionmaking.
The Virginia Takeover Act, Delay, and Target Management
Additional support for Rule 14d-2(b) lies in the argument that
the preemptive effect of the rule cures the disruption that state
takeover statutes can cause to "the neutrality indispensable for the
proper operation of the federal market approach to tender offers
regulation. 15 2
The Virginia Takeover Act Does Not Operate to the Benefit of
Target Management
Maintenance of neutrality between target management and raid-
ers was not an objective of the Williams Act;15 3 rather, neutrality
was a byproduct of the Williams Act subject to adjustment by the
implementation of state policies." The incorrect assumption that
state takeover statutes favor target management compounds the
error of attributing to Congress the objective of neutrality. Empiri-
cal evidence disputes the assumption of management bias in the
state statutes.
The provision in the Virginia statute for a hearing, the source of
the greatest potential for delay, is difficult to trigger. 55 The Vir-
150. Rubin, Arbitrage, Takeover Stragegy: The Investment Banker's Role-A Panel, 32
Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977).
151. Id.
152. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279-80 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
153. See text accompanying notes 121-122 supra.
154. See notes 121-124 & accompanying text supra.
155. Buford, The Virginia Takeover Statute, State Takeover Statutes and New Take-
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ginia Act requires a showing of good cause as a prerequisite for a
hearing.156 As a result, in the majority of takeover bids the "delay"
caused by the statute is only three weeks. Moreover, if the state
takeover statutes were promanagement, one would expect the state
statutes to have a chilling effect on tender offers. The number of
tender offers, however, has increased as the number of states with
takeover statutes has increased. In 1970, when only two states in
addition to Virginia had takeover statutes, thirty-four tender offers
occurred. 157 By 1976, twenty-three states had takeover legislation,
and 107 tender offers were lodged that year.158 The number of
states with tender offer statutes in 1978 was thirty-three, and the
number of acquisition proposals for public companies announced
in 1978 was 325.159
Promanagement State Statutes Effect Legitimate State Policies
and Benefit Target Shareholders
Even if tender offer statutes benefit target management, the re-
sult effects legitimate state policies. Any protection afforded by the
state statutes is directed less at making local industry profitable or
retaining incumbent management than at keeping local industry
locally controlled. 160 The state is the source of the corporate char-
ter, and consequently, the state should have the right to regulate
the attributes of a resident corporation's stock. Furthermore,
states have a legitimate interest in the effect a takeover has on the
economic well-being of the state. Evidence suggests that states are
concerned justifiably about the potential adverse consequence of
takeovers and that the efforts at substantive regulations to miti-
gate the adverse consequences are logical products of this
over Strategies-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1469 (1977). Information from the Securities Divi-
sion of the Virginia State Corporation Commission that only two hearings have been held
since the hearing mechanism was established in 1968, although eight takeover bids have
been lodged in that period, supports Mr. Buford's contention that the State Corporation
Commission has "shown some reluctance to require a hearing," id. at 1470.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(a)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
157. See Appleton, The Proposed Requirements, The Proposed SEC Tender Offer
Rules-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1381 (1977).
158. Id. See A Response to Great Western, supra note 25, at 909 n.270.
159. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 n.1 (1979).
160. See Boehm, supra note 15, at 744-46.
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concern. 161
Regarding shareholders, states have a legitimate interest in as-
suring resident shareholders adequate time to reach an informed
decision on the basis of complete and accurate information. Evi-
dence indicates, moreover, that shareholders usually win when the
target corporation rejects an initial takeover attempt."6 2 A study of
thirty-six unsolicited tender offers that the target company re-
jected between the end of 1973 and June 1979 "show[s] that the
shares of more than 50 per cent of the targets are either today at a
higher market price than the rejected offer price or were acquired
after the tender offer was defeated by another company at a price
higher than the offer price.''1163 In addition, in virtually every com-
pany that initially resisted the takeover and was acquired subse-
quently, the company's shareholders received a higher price than
the original offer. 6
161. The Commissioner of the SEC has stated that $100 billion has been spent rejuggling
existing corporate assets through mergers and takeovers, an amount "that could have been
dovoted [sic] to new production and employment opportunities," but because the billions
are spent instead on acquiring existing corporate structures, the amount "does not flow back
as new capacity, improvements in productivity, innovation, new products or new jobs."
Mintz, Playing the Corporate Takeover Game, Wash. Post, April 18, 1980, at All, col. 1.
The testimony of a potential target's chief executive officer before the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business illustrates the negative effects of a takeover on the community of
the subject company. The officer estimated that the dollar loss to the corporation's state,
Wisconsin, in the event of a successful takeover and consequent closing of the firm's local
headquarters would have been $3,481,134, half of its remuneration for 71 employees. He
valued the contribution to a variety of state and city community causes that would disap-
pear at $411,359, including $71,101 to the United Way, $77,665 to the University School of
Milwaukee, $60,000 to the Milwaukee Children's Hospital, $17,500 to the United Performing
Arts Fund, and $7,500 to the Milwaukee Symphony. Additional losses would include:
$319,268 to local insurance companies for corporate coverage; $35,194 to two local banks for
interest charges; $383,783 to local professional firms for accounting and legal fees and other
services. Mintz, The Takeover Game, Wash. Post, April 20, 1980 at A2, col. 1. See also
Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) (discussing adverse impact of takeover
on target's employees and community). For the proposition that locally based industries
tend to be more involved in community affairs than their counterparts that are branches of
large corporations, see Boehm, supra note 15, at 741-46.
162. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 106 (1979).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 108 n.30 (based on an unpublished study by Goldman, Sachs & Co. of 85
takeover bids between January 1, 1976 and June 8, 1979).
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CONCLUSION
The new SEC rules, specifically Rule 14d-2(b), directly conflict
with the Virginia Takeover Act because they provide a time limit
of five days after the public announcement of a tender offer within
which the offer must commence, whereas the Virginia Act requires
a twenty-one day waiting period after the announcement of a
tender offer before the offer may commence. The reasons proffered
by the SEC for promulgating the rules, curtailing precommence-
ment market activity and reducing the risk of target investor deci-
sions without adequate information, do not justify the sacrifice of
state interests resulting from federal divestment of state regula-
tion. Neither does the Virginia statutory scheme contribute to the
adverse effects of precommencement offers cited by the SEC.
Rather, the Virginia statute discourages adverse precommence-
ment market activity and uninformed decisions by target share-
holders. An additional reason advanced for promulgation of the
rules, preemption of state statutes, contradicts the legislative his-
tory of the Williams Act, judicial assessment of the relation be-
tween federal and state securities regulation, and the policy objec-
tives of the Virginia Takeover Act and the Williams Act.
Speculation as to the actual reason why the SEC promulgated
the time limit provision in Rule 14d-2(b) is justified because the
reason for the rule proffered by the SEC collapse under analysis.
Perhaps the Commission read the report of the American Bar As-
sociation, which concluded in part that the nature of tender offer
litigation renders unlikely judicial resolution of the preemption
question in the near future16 and, seizing the initiative, issued the
rule for the sole purpose of preempting state takeover statutes.
Speculation as to why the SEC is so adamant a champion of pre-
emption ranges from ascription to the Commission of malevolent
ambitions to ascription of malevolent ignorance. Perhaps the SEC
is haunted by the spectre of "old boy" networks of corporate man-
agers pulling strings in state capitals across the country and wan-
gling legislation to keep management entrenched. Perhaps the
SEC is using the rule as a lever with which to magnify its power by
engulfing an entire area of regulation traditionally left to the state.
165. State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, supra note 27.
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Whatever the actual reason behind the SEC attempt to preempt
state statutes, the Commission likely will suffer disappointment
because preemption of the state takeover statutes contradicts the
history of the Williams Act, offends judicial assessment of the rela-
tion between federal and state regulation of securities, and dis-
rupts the policy objectives of the federal and state statutory
schemes.
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